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THIS study has examined a number of credit factors and has
found that some of them are definite indices of risk. For
example, stability of occupation and residence, possesiof
certain assets, and a relatively large do'n imyiiient in sales
finance transactions, are more frequently characteristic of
good loans than of bad. These findings are interesting from
the point of view of credit theory. They provide support
for some of the widely held opinions of practical credit execu-
tives; they also contradict other widely held opinions; and
they furnish evidence of some unsuspected relationships. thus
suggesting further study. But fromthe practical point of
view, from the point of view of improving credit policy,
what is the value of these findings?
A rough analogy can be drawn between the insurance
business and the consumer financing business. In the former,
the premiums charged different types of risks vary in ac-
cordance with the actuarially determined costs of underwrit-
ing these risks; thus in group life insurance, the premium
depends Ofl the industrial classification and the average age
of the insured group. Conceivably the consumer finance
business could follow the same policy; it could accumulate
extensive experience tables showing the costs of handling
various types of risks, and it could charge accordingly. Ac-
tually, however, the consumer financing business is not
likely to pursue this policy closely because of the difficulty,
if not the impossibility, of obtaining the necessary experience
tables, and because of the unpracticality of discriminating be-
tween borrowers.APPRAISAL OP RESULTS
And yet in a limited sense, the consumer finance business
does pursue this policy. Different individual lending firms
cater to somewhat different types of borrowers and charge
different fees. A commercial banker, for example, may de-
dde to make low-rate loans to low-cost, good-risk applicants.
The banker will attempt to determine a rough dividing line
that will enable him to separate the high-cost, unprofitable
applicants from the low-cost, profitable ones. The high-cost
applicants although unacceptable to this particular banker,
will probably be able to obtain loans from other sources at
higher rates. Although the banker will realize that some of
the profitable risks are much more profitable than others,
he will probably charge the same fees to all. Nevertheless,
some individual institutions do vary their charges with the
risk; for example, some personal finance companies make
special rates to teachers.
Each lender has the problem of determining what types
of borrowers he can accommodate at his prevailing rates.
He will probably decide that some part of his business can
represent marginal, and even slightly submarginal borrow-
ers, who do not completely pay their own way, as long as
the greater part of the business consists of supermarginal
borrowers, who more than pay their own way. For this reason
he does not have to determine precisely where the margin
lies between the profitable and the unprofitable applicants;
he does not have to emulate the experience tables of the
insurance actuary; but he must attempt to arrive at some
sort of solution, however rough, for without it creditpolicy
cannot be formulated.
REVISION OF CREDIT POLICY
Any lender who wishes to revise his credit policy may ob-
viously proceed in one of two general directions: he mayin-
augurate more rigid standards, whichwill probably result
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in decreased collection troubles, decreased losses, and also
decreased volume of business; or he may relax his standards,
which will result in an increase in both volume of business
and collection problems. When credit policy is to be altered,
allpossible results must be consideredparticularly the
effect on net income. If standards are to be raised, how much
will the volume of business be reduced; can this loss bere-
covered by an increase in advertising addressed to the more
desirable classes of risks; how much will credit losses and
collection difficulties be reduced; and what will be the final
effect on profits? If, on the other hand, standards are to be
relaxed, what will be the increase in volume andgross
revenue; will additional advertising be necessary to attract
the new borrowers; will the present collection department
be able to keep losses within reasonable bounds; and what
will be the effect on profits?
In deciding whether he will relax standards, restrict stand-
ards, or continue his present policy, a lender may find that
the data compiled in this study give him valuable clues, and
he may be able to gain supplementary similar data of his
own by using the methods illustrated here; but probably
he will also require other data oniy obtainable by other
methods. The ensuing discussion isan attempt to illustrate
how a lender may proceed towarda rational decision. If
some of the suggestions border on the impracticable, they
will serve to show that a completely rational andscientific
approach to risk selection is not possible.
STUDY OF COSTS
Probably the first step thatany lender should take is to make
a simple analysis of his costs. Totalgross income can be
broken down into three generalparts: a part necessary to
cover collection costs, which include collectors' salaries,court
fees, and other expenses incidentalto handling delinquencies,APPRAISAL OF RESULTS 95
as well asactual losses charged off; a part necessary to cover
non-collection costs, which include all costs notincidental
to handlingdelinquent accounts; and a third part represent-
mg net profit.If the first part is very small, the lender will
not beparticularly interested in trying to reduce it further
by means of greaterrestrictiveness; he will be snore interested
in reducing his non-collection costsby increasing efficiency
of operatiOfl or infinding ways to bring in new business.
If collection costs arehigh. however, an attempt to reduce
them is certainly inorder; but the success of the attempt
depends upon the possibilityof culling out from among
present borrowers a groupof particularly unsatisfactory ones.
Evidence of the sort presentedin this study is designed to
distinguish the more satisfactoryborrowers from the less
satisfactory, but the distinctionis primarily qualitative. Our
evidence has shown that a youngmechanic with employment
and residence tenure of lessthan three years, and without
bank account, life insurance, orreal estate, is one of the
poorer risks; but sincethe fact that the risk is poordoes not
mean that it isnecessarily unprofitable an estimateof the
cost of granting loans toborrowers of this general typeis
essential. The only clueprovided by this study is thebad-
loan relative, which may beused as a rough measureof the
comparative collection costs ofdifferent classes of borrowers.
Consider the first credit-ratingformula of Chapter 4, for
example. The class of borrowerswith ratings of less than.50,
which includes the abovemechanic, has a bad-loanrelative
of 4.0, and that with ratingsof 2.25 and over has arelative
of .2. One possible inferenceis that the collection costs
(though not the non-collectioncosts) of the first class are
twenty times those ofthe second class andfour times as
much as the average for allclasses.
The bad-loan relative, however,is no more than an approx-
imation. There are two reasons.First, the relative issub-
ject to sampling error, whichis large in samplesof 200 loans0
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and is still appreciable in samplesof 1000. Second,the bad- loan relative may bean intrinsically poor methodof esti-
mating actual costs, for thelucre fact that bad loansare four times more numerousamong borrowers with ratingsof less than .50 thanamong all borrowers does notprove that col-
lection costs are also four timesas high; they may beeither more or less than four times. A muchmore reliable, butat the same timemore onerous method is to makea study of the actual collectioncosts incurred. For eachdelinquentac- count in the questioned class,an estimate would bemade of the cost of follow-up letterssent out, of the portionof col- lectoi-s' or attorneys'salaries allocableto the account,and of any otherexpenses or credit losses thatmight have been incurred. Theproper allocation ofexpenses between col- lection costs andnon-collection costs isa serious costac- counting problem;nevertheless, it isnecessary if the study is to be comprehensive
If the collectioncosts for borrowers withratings of less than .50 are four timesas high as theaverage for all borrow-
ersas the bad-loan relativesuggests-_js this indicatethat the group in questionis Unprofitable? Ifnot, how high would the relative haveto be in order tosuggest unprofitability? The dividing linebetween profitabilityand unprofitability, the breakevenpoint, can beroughly estimated fromthe fol- lowing simpleformula:
Net profit + Colection costs + Kx Non-coIIeçjocosts
Collection costs
The cost andprofit iterns in thisformula referto the totals for an individualenterp"-ise whichmay be expressed in actual dollars,or as a percentageof grossrevenue, or in a number of otherways; the constant Kdepends upon overhead costs.
By rejectingan applicant, a lendercan avoid a number of expenses that he wouldotherwise haveto incur in carryingAPPRAISAL OF RESULTS 7
the loan tomaturity, but he cannot recover any of the ex-
penses alreadyincurred in investigating the applicant; there
is, therefore, a strongincentive to accept an applicant once
he has beeninvestigated, and the incentive is particularly
strong if thesestink or overhead costs form a large part of
the total non-collection costs.The constant K in the above
formula is the ratio ofoverhead costs to total non-collection
costs, so that it canconceivably vary from 0 to I. Obviously,
as K becomeslarger, the breakeven point determinedby
the formula willincrease. To determine K accurately is a
difficult, if not impossible cost accountingprOl)lern, but to
make a satisfactoryrough estimate is prOl)ably within the
power of mostlenders.
This formula may beillustrated as follows. Suppose non-
collection costs accountfor 60 percent of the total gross re-
ceipts; that collection costsaccount for 15 percent; andthat
the remainder, 25 percent,represents net profit. If there are
no overhead costsSothat K is zerothe breakevenpoint
is 22,4; if allnon-collection costs are overheadsothat K
is oneit is62,4. Actually, the true valueof the break-
even point liessomewhere between these two extremes;if
K is 1/s, indicating thatone-third of non.collection costs are
overhead, the breakevenpoint will he exactly 4,which is
the same as the had-loanrelative for borrowers withratings
of less than .50; if K is2/5, the breakeven pointwill be 51/3.
If the simple assumptionsin the foregoingillustration are
realistic, the class of borrowerswith ratings of less than.50
is approximately marginaland an attempt toexclude this
class from loan service is notlikely to have apronounced
effect on net profits. As wepointed out whenpresenting the
efficiency index, the raisingof credit standardsnaturally re-
sults in the eliminationof a portion of thebad loans; but
it almost invariablyresults in the eliminationof a somewhat
smaller portion of thegood loans. Thisprinciple can be
extended to includeconsiderations of cost.The raising ofcredit standards will reduce bad-debt losses andcollection
expenses, but it will also reduce the volume ofbusin55
and gross income; and if high overhead costsare involved
it may even raise the average operatingcost per Joan. A real
increase in net profits can only he accomplishedby isolating
and eliminating some class of borrowers thatcontains a much
larger percentage of bad loans than of goodloans, a class
that contributes little to the company'sincome whilecon-
tributing much to itsexpenses. In our analysis sucha class
can be identified by a high bad-loan relative whichis likely
to be found only in conjunction witha factor having a high
efficiency index.
An example of thesort of situation that wouldpermit
profitable restriction of risksappears in the following purely
hypothetical distribution of loans(figures indicatingper-
cents):
Class
A B C D E F
Coodloans I 2 5 22 40 30 Badloans 16 22 32 16 10 4 Bad-loan relatjvc 16.011.0 6.4 .7 .3 .1
Here the efficiency indexof 62 is just twice that ofthe first
credit-rating formula in Chapter4. Class A and Class Bare
probably both submarginal;Class C is doubtful.Elimina-
tion of Classes A and Bwould not havean appreciable effect
on the volume of satisfactorybusinessbut it would have
a veiy pronounced effecton the unsatisfactory business;the
good business would bedecreased by 3percent, and the bad
business by 38percent. Unfortunately,our researches have not yet succeeded inuncovering a situationeven approach- ing this, ora single clearly submarginalbad-loan relative.
From this fact followsthe tentativeconclusion that the or-
ganizations submittingsamples have beensufficiently careful in selecting risksso that further selection ishardly necessary. Of course, thisconclusion is foundedon rather meager
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evidence. A detailed examination of the costs involved might
indicate otherwise; and if we could obtain additional data
such as information on moral character, past payment record,
and other considerations not available at presentwe might
be able to construct a much more effective credit formula,
which would permit profitable restriction of borrowers. But
the inherent nature of the consumer financing business
argues against restriction. The instalment financing busi-
ness does not aim at exclusiveness, for its function is to
reach out and extend facilities to the general public. To deny
facilities to all but the elite among risks is to defeat the
fundamental purpose of consumer credit as well as to forego
an opportunity for profit. Overthe past two decades the
trend has been toward more liberal credit terms and better
collection procedure; and the business has prospered.
VALUE OF CREDIT ANALYSiS
Owing to the fact that the analysis of credit experience is
expensive and that the practical value of the results appears
to be limited, many lenders mayconclude that analysis is not
worth while. They may be willing to admit that empirical
studies will point the way to greater efficiency of operation,
and yet very justifiably contend that the improvementin
operating experience will not pay for the research necessary
to achieve it. They may feel that thesearch for efficiency in
the particular begets inefficiency in the whole. They may
point out, and rightly, that risk selection entails amargin
of uncertainty that defies solution, and thatregardless of
research no lender can ever expect to perfecthis selection
technique to the point of no losses. They may arguethat.
after two decades of experience lenders havelearned enough
to identify and reject the fewimpossible risks, and to collect
from the others. In short, they will prefer to trusttheir own
judgment and let good enough alone. Thisview, however,S
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is probably extreme. Most large lenders carry on research
programs, and they presumably feel that continual critical
analysis of their operating policies is justified because it
tends to keep the organizations alert even though the results
may not lead to revolutionary improvements in technique.
For these lenders, the problem is to keep the cost of the
research program within reasonable limits.
The actuarial analysis of risk along the lines used in in-
surance is the goal toward which credit research should
strive. The efficient design of a research program consists
in proceeding as far as possible in that direction without in-
curring undue expenses. The method of risk analysis that
we have illustrated has the prime advantage of being inex-
pensive; and itis particularly inexpensive when lenders'
files are arranged to permit quick random sampling. A lender
might easily manage a sample analysis of four or five hundred
loans a yearparticularly if the work could be done in
periods of slack business. After several years the accumula-
tion of evidence should be impressive. The reliat)ility of
findings will be enhanced by repeated confirmation;ques-
tionable results obtained in the earlier years will be amplified
and explained by the results of subsequent years; andany
pronounced cyclical or secular changes will become apparent.
But the sample method, though inexpensive, has the disad-
vantage of lacking precision, particularly in its failure to
relate risk experience to costs and profits. This method is
primarily a preliminary method; it sufficesto test intuitive
hypotheses and to formulate new problems. As the prelini-
mary evidence accumulates, issues will crystalizeissues that
can, perhaps, be solved only by the more precise, andmore
costly, methods.
The fact that the risk problem has beendiscussed here
in pecuniary terms should not obscure itsbroader social as-
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pects. An unwiseloan may become a disaster to the bor-
rower. The borrowerwho succeeds in repaying an unwise
loan may undergo greathardship in doing so. The borrower
who does not succeed may findhis credit standing impaired;
if he signed a chattel mortgage,his furniture or automobile
may be seized;if his friends acted as comakers, they may be
embarrassed by legal proceedings; he may evenlose his job;
and in any case, he is bound tolose a meure of his self-
respect his self-confidence,and his social position. The lender
who is sensitive about hispublic relations faces two serious
dilemmas. In selecting applicants,he may refuse all loans
that seem questionable orunwise, but if he does so, he will
divert considerable business tohis competitors. In collecting
delinquent accounts, he cannotafford to be over.lenient,
for he may encourage furtherdelinquencies; and he cannot
afford to be over-aggressive, for he maysuffer a serious loss
of good will.
The social appraisal of consumercredit faces the same sort
of dilemma. Consumer creditfills a social function in making
credit available to those whowould otherwise not be able
to obtain it; but atthe same time it has unfortunateeffects
on the minoritywho have difficulty in repayingtheir loans.
Strictly speaking, social gain andsocial loss are intangibles
that cannot be measured.Nevertheless, it is impossible to
entirely suppress the question: howshould risk selection be
organized to obtain the maximumsocial gain at the expense
of the minimum social loss?